Abstract: This paper seeks to examine some of the perceptions and attitudes developed by Muslims in relation to the social conflict of Maluku. This paper argues that there were no single views among Muslims with regard to the conflict. Some Muslim hard-liners in general have demonstrated hostile perceptions and confrontational attitudes toward their perceived enemy. They constructed the conflict as a "religious war," and demanded that the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI) issue a fatwa> that would allow Muslims outside Maluku to fight against the enemy in Maluku. The Muslim moderates, on the other hand, tended to avoid religious vocabularies, while attempting to work out peaceful solutions. The semiofficial MUI, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Muhammadiyyah perceived the conflict as not religiously driven; they viewed the conflict in a more sophisticated way. They saw no need to wage a religious war and no need to issue a fatwa> for a national jiha> d.
Introduction
There is little doubt that the sectarian violence which erupted in Maluku from early 1999 until early 2002 that claimed more than 6,000 lives and displaced some 70,000 others has its historical, political, economic, and religious origins and implications. During the conflict and peace process, speculations, reactions, and perceptions have become parts of the story: some tended to exacerbate the situation, while others wanted to improve it. Muslims, in their diversity, have become part of the players as well as spectators of the conflict. In order to get a wider picture, it is important to comprehend how "radical" and "moderate" Muslims perceived the conflict and why they perceived the way they did. This comprehension is important because conflict can be well understood from a dynamic of interconnectedness between three dimensions: 1) context or situation of conflict, 2) perceptions of parties involved directly or indirectly in conflict, and 3) behavior of parties involved during conflict. 1 Some observers have tended to underestimate the role of religion in Maluku conflict. 2 There is some agreement that religion serves simply as a complimentary factor in the conflict, emphasizing political, military, and economic factors. For example, Tri Ratnawati concluded that the clashes in Maluku are not a religious war. 3 Azyumardi Azra equally maintained that religion indeed plays a certain role in this communal conflict, but this role comes only later. 4 Gerry van Klinken also contended that the conflict lies not so much in inter-religious area. 5 Likewise, the International Crisis Group (ICG) viewed religion as a minor factor. They stated in a report: "Though often described in terms of a Christian-Muslim fight, at the core of the Maluku violence lies economic and political competition between local interests. Wrapped around this core is a series of external problems ranging
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Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 from the national agenda of a resurgent group of Muslim politicians to efforts by some segments of the military to undermine the (former) government of Abdurrahman Wahid." 6 The above suggestions, however, should not overlook the fact that both parties involved either directly or indirectly in the Maluku conflict have perceived each other in religious terms. It can be accordingly argued that there is some truth in the theory of "race between Islam and Christianity" at least in their discourses. This paper attempts to reconstruct the history of the diversity of Muslim perceptions of the conflict that lasted from 1999 to 2002.
In Southeast Asia, Muslims and Christians have been in quarrel since their first contact in sixteenth century. 7 In light of this, recent conflict in Maluku can be better placed in the context of a long history of Muslim-Christian rivalry in the region. As can be seen below, it was the religious divide that played an important role in the durability and degree of conflict. If religion had not served as a crucial factor, the nature and scope of the conflict in Maluku would have been very different from what was happening.
In general, there are two main perceptions and attitudes of Muslims in relation to the conflict in Maluku: confrontation and reconciliation. Hard-line individuals and organizations have tended to be confrontational, whereas the moderates have been more concerned with peaceful solutions.
Voices of Confrontation
Some common issues can be found in the radicals' perceptions of the conflict in Maluku: Christianization, separatism, and colonialism which were seen as historically interconnected in Maluku. They also often used strong religious vocabularies during the conflict. In addition, Muslim radicals regarded the traditional institution of pela gandong as an ineffective practice and would not see its future in Maluku because it is un-Islamic and is used by Christians to loosen and even break Islamic ties between Muslims.
6 ICG in Peter Searle, "Ethnic-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent Developments in Southeast Asia," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no Commerce 1450 -1680 Just after the first outbreak on early January 1999, Muslim Ambonese activists were quick to be very convinced that the riot was masterminded by Christian groups. Rivalry between gangs who happened to be different in religion was just triggering factor. They believed that the so-called Reds (Christians) came first and, they claimed, Muslims had to use another color distinguishing them from Christians in the battle (White). From here on, conflicts escalated in different places in Maluku in which Islam and Christianity became identity. Grouping was based on religion, not by brotherhood (pela) or sub-ethnic groups.
The "conspiracy theory" began to be spread by hard-line Muslims. Rustam Kastor, an Ambonese retired Indonesian army officer, who was proud of having military background and claimed to represent 'Muslim side', published a series of book arguing that South Moluccan Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) and Christians were the political conspirators who had long planned to destroy and expel Muslims from Ambon, Maluku. His books soon become very popular among local Muslims and Muslims from outside Maluku. What made his books so appealing is that Rustam used a language shared by Muslims. Rustam insisted since the beginning that "this is a religious war." For him, Christians always misused the facts, spread lies, and blamed Muslims for all the riots. Rustam intended to convince Muslims that it was the Muslims who have become the victims of the political conspiracy of Christians. 8 Rustam insists that the time of attack on the day when Muslims had religious celebration after the fasting month of Ramadhan was not spontaneous. In addition, the fact that the place from which the Christian attackers on the following day came was Central Church at Matanatha (Gereja Pusat Matanatha) indicates, Rustam believed, that Christians were the main actors. Moreover, Rustam observed, the primary targets of insults were all religious symbols related to Islam (Mosque, the Qur'a> n, Prophet Muh} ammad, kubah at the top of the mosque, religious schools (madrasah), religious offices such as the Office of Religious Affairs (KUA) and the Office of Department of Religion (Kandepag). 9 To justify his belief, Rustam repeatedly quoted a Rustam's articles were published during the conflicts, which were then refuted by Suara Maluku and other newspapers. Rustam answered back the refutations from Suara Maluku, still being convinced by his own speculations. Rustam was very proud of having a military background and claims to represent a Muslim voice in Maluku. Rustam's books attracted wide audience, especially amongst hard-liners in Maluku but perhaps more significantly outside Maluku.
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Rustam Kastor was appointed to be a committee member on Ambon case by Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) of Maluku but was then replaced by Thamrin Ely, another Ambonese because, according to Thamrin, Rustam had a "personal motive". The former President Abdurrahman Wahid considered Rustam to be one of the provocateurs in Maluku, but Wahid did not bring him into trial. 15 Thamrin Ely, an Ambonese Muslim activist, the secretary of MUI of Maluku branch, and the president of National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) of Maluku branch, believed in similar scenario that Christians planned the attack on January 19, 1999. One of the indicatios was that the "Reds" emerged before the "Whites". Thamrin Ely denied the accusation from Christians that Muslims had prepared the war before that day by building action units (satuan tugas). Like Rustam Kastor, Thamrin Ely was convinced that elements of the RMS and Christians were behind the attack. Thamrin admitted that both polarization of religion and "national political scenario" were the main factors behind the conflict. Yet, Thamrin disagreed with the marginalization theory which holds that Christians became increasingly marginalized in local economy and politics. In fact, Thamrin argued, there were still more Christians in the government officials. Therefore, it is not true to point economic gap as an important factor. There is something more religious. Thamrin believed that religious polarization is a colonial legacy. "Christian Ambonese peoples were treated very well by European colonials: good education, Malay language learning, and most became colonial bureaucrats albeit at lower level. Only Christians were allowed to become Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) soldiers, whereas most Muslim immigrants came to Ambon for trade and entrepreneurship. As new Muslim pilgrims became increased, Middle Eastern traders came to Ambon as well. Colonialism and Christianity were so close that as nationalism came, Ambonese Muslims regarded it as a hope, whereas Christians viewed it as a threat. 17 Another Ambonese Muslim activist who believed in Christianization project behind the riots is Umar Tuasikal, who lived in Java and was active at Association for Moluccan Muslim Families (Himpunan Keluarga Muslim Maluku, HIKMMA). In his book published on January 2000, Umar insisted that the root cause of the conflict has been religious antagonism, a continuation of Perang Salib (the medieval Crusades). Umar considered the Christian attacks in early 1999 as part of a grand 'mission sacrée'. He quoted the term "La Conquete du Monde Musulman" to refer this phenomenon. Umar believed, Christian imperialists came to Maluku for spices and for converting Maluku people into Christianity. In this book, Christians were perceived as 'aggressors' and therefore Muslims had the obligation to defend their home, life, and religion (jiha> d). Umar cited Qur'anic verses to justify this belief in jiha> d. "Fighting is prescribed upon you and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth and ye know not." (II: 216) For Umar, RMS is in fact Republik Maluku Serani (Nasrani, Christians).
Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 Umar believed that the bloody Idul Fitri conflict has been long planned by Christian RMS. Umar was convinced that through radios, Christian groups had already consolidated their people from Moluccan Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku, GPM). Umar writes, "In a meeting in a church in Lateri village in the eastern part of Ambon Christians decided the time for massive attack against Muslims. There was no agreement between old and young people at the meeting. The young wanted the attack to be held at the first takbi> r at the time of Idul Fitri prayer, whereas the old wanted it soon after the prayer when Muslims were neglectful." Umar accused that the plan was not only known by Christians in Ambon, but also in the Netherlands and other regions in Indonesia. 18 Umar believed that Christians had attempted to shift the real cause from religious antagonism to economic, political, and social gap. Muslims, he believed, have been victimized by a wider Christian conspiracy. Umar justified his belief by referring to Samuel Huntington's theory of clash of civilizations. For him, Eastern Indonesia is being planned to become "Eastern Christendom".
After ten months of conflict, M. Husni Putuhena, another Ambonese activist, published a book entitled 'Buku Putih Tragedi Kemanusiaan dalam Kerusuhan di Maluku" (A True Story: Human Tragedy in Maluku Riots). Putuhena concluded that Idul Fitri violence was engineered by both Church in Maluku and RMS in the Netherlands and was supported by Christian organizations in Maluku. The timing of the attack (Idul Fitri, Muslim celebration after Ramadhan fasting) was chosen purposefully, indicating that their intention was religious. Regarding the role of RMS, the date (January 19) was one day after the anniversary of RMS (January 18 th 1950). Putuhena believed that the attack was aimed to reduce the number of Muslims in Maluku, either through slaughtering or forced exodus to allow Christians to separate from Indonesia. The burnings of mosques and Muslim houses were believed to be a revenge of Maluku Christians for the previous burnings of Church outside Maluku, especially during Ketapang riot on November 22, 1998. The attack was also believed to have a global aim of Protestant Oikumene (one place, one Church, one God). Putuhena believed that Christian leaders used two means: violence and peace, but they provoked peoples with lies and facts manipulation. The attack also shows, Putuhena argued, jealousy, revenge, and hatred on the Christian side toward Muslims. 19 While the above activists are local, hard-line groups such as Laskar Jihad came when the conflict had occurred for more than one year (April 2000) . The arrival of Laskar Jihad does not suggest that local Muslims were not perceiving the battle as religious. Before their arrival, religious polarization had existed. The arrival simply exacerbated the existing polarization and made much more violence. Laskar Jihad (literary meaning "holy war troops"), was a paramilitary division under the Communication Forum for the Followers and the Community of the Prophet (Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama'ah, FKAWJ). The chief, Ja'far Umar Thalib was a charismatic Wahhabis cleric, who went to Afghanistan from 1987 to 1989, driven by his sense of Islamic solidarity. Originally, the founding of FKAWJ can be seen as a search for authenticity, but it turned out to be anti-Christianism, antisemitism, and anti-Americanism. But Laskar Jihad represents a later phase of revivalism, namely "neo-fundamentalism". FKAWJ had different social activities but Laskar Jihad was specifically aimed to be a militia paramilitary group. 20 Thalib appeared to be both religiously and politically radical. He often criticized the government especially regarding what he believed as insulting Islamic interests. Although Ja'far once denied himself as being radical, saying: "I am not radical. I tend to be rational in seeing all problems; political principles that I take can be discussed rationally and responsibly," Ja'far cannot deny the facts that his activities were largely radical religiously and politically. Ja'far declared Muslims, to confront the attack would be an obligation incumbent on the Muslims who are being attacked and it would be also compulsory for other Muslims to help them." 21 Ja'far knew that his decision was controversial but he did not care about other opinions and the government's interdiction because, he believed, quick action was necessary or Muslims in Maluku would be destroyed by the Christian RMS. Ja'far observed that there was manipulation of 'conflict mapping' about what was happening around Maluku conflict, but he was not clear what he meant by this. Yet, Ja'far claimed, "what is happening in Maluku is not a conflict between Islam and Christianity, but between RMS or neo-RMS rebels and Indonesian nationalists. Therefore, all loyal Muslim nationalists should fight against the rebels." 22 Here it becomes obvious that the reason why he used the vocabulary of jiha> d was to attract wider audience of Muslims: not only Ambonese, but also and mostly, Javanese and other Muslim Indonesians. Ja'far succeeded in trying to appeal to a wider community by emphasizing that the issue at stake in Maluku was about Christian separatism versus Muslims nationalists, while using strong religious vocabularies (fatwa> and jiha> d).
When the situation in Maluku after about two years became increasingly under control since the government carried out reconciliation programs, Thalib disbanded Laskar Jihad and FKAWJ after a meeting of the Executive Board in October 2002. The disbanding was taken because the original mission had become deviated with "too political" activities. The original missions were, Thalib himself explained, to carry out religious duty to help Muslim brothers in conflict area when the government was incapable. When the government controlled the situation, Laskar Jihad saw no need to continue its activities. 23 It seemed that Laskar Jihad' s withdrawal from Ambon and Maluku received positive response from different elements, but some local Muslims admitted that they still needed Laskar Jihad. Some argued that it was time for the national government to deal with RMS which was widely believed among Muslims as the main cause of the conflict in Maluku. It was said that fatwa> s from Arab Saudi influenced the decision to withdraw. This indicates, as a Muslim historian Azyumardi Azra argues, that there was a direct network between Indonesia and the Middle East. Others, like Amidhan, the chief of MUI, contended that the withdrawal signified that people had begun to trust their government in solving the conflict. 24 However, some Muslim elements praised the various efforts of Laskar Jihad in Maluku. An Islamic newspaper, Republika, appreciated the presence of Laskar Jihad in Maluku for they had benefited Muslims in Maluku. Laskar Jihad proved to have assisted and protected local Muslims from being defeated by the enemy; they were also praised of having all the courage to defend Indonesia from RMS separatism wishing for national disintegration. Even the governor of Maluku, Saleh Latuconsina, was reported to have been surprised by the withdrawal of Laskar Jihad. Saleh admitted that now with the absence of Laskar Jihad, social service (religious preaching, free medical aid, and education) that was initiated and carried out by Laskar Jihad during their arrival in Maluku now stopped operating. Saleh observed that many local Muslims in Maluku complained the withdrawal because they still needed Laskar Jihad.
Another hard-liner involved in the conflict is Front to the Defenders of Islam (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) of Maluku. The front issued a statement called "Intensive Analysis: Data and Facts on Maluku Conflict", in which there are some indications about the role of RMS and Christianity in Maluku conflict. FPI claimed that the attack was planned by Church, referring to a thesis by DS A.N. Radjawane, entitled "Islam in Ambon and Haruku", which indicates that Christianization project has long been planned: "Nowadays a concrete plan in the evangelist strategy on Muslims has not been possessed by Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM), but we should be grateful that Church has began to open their eyes towards the efforts of Christianization in Maluku." 25 Another hard-line organization which has the main base in Jakarta is Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI). KISDI has been famous for their vocal voice for "Islamic causes". HA Sumargono, the secretary general, believed that Maluku conflict has turned out to be a religious war, not
Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 simply ordinary bloody riots. KISDI demanded the government and security apparatus to be sincere and fair in solving the Ambon case and not to hide the real problem, which is Christianization-separatism. KISDI believed that Ambon has become the field of jiha> d. This decision was taken without prior fatwa> issued by Islamic organizations such as MUI. "The situation in Ambon", Sumargono observed, "is very worrying and this could harm the future of Maluku as part of the unitary state of Indonesia." He said that Muslim victims in Ambon are shahi> d, just like those who die in fight in the name of God. Muslims' condition was believed to become worst as they were continuously attacked and expelled from their home and village. The attacks against Muslims must be ended, Sumargono demanded. In the meantime, Sumargono asked, "Don't take weapons from Muslims right away because they still need them for their defense against others' attacks. Christian leaders must be more active in ending the violent acts conducted by their followers." 26 The role of those hard-liners seem to suggest that a deadly ethnic riot like in Maluku has proved to serve as the proving ground of extremist organizations, which sometimes provides leadership. The riot may test mettle, cement esprit de corps, and aid their recruitment efforts. Laskar Jihad and FPI were born out of the violence and contributed to a considerable share to later violent episodes. Violence may thus give enduring organizational expression to the polarization of sentiment. 27 Activists from outside Maluku have been also involved in justifying the conflict in Maluku. An Islamic politician who was also a member of Indonesian parliament (DPR), Abdul Qadir Djaelani equally believed in religious conspiracy theory. Djaelani Another activist, Al-Chaidar, who is Acehnese, organized The Great Preaching/Meeting (Tablig Akbar) attended by some 100, 000 people at National Monument Jakarta on January 7 th , 2000. The Great Meeting declared jiha> d to Ambon. In one of his articles, Al-Chaidar believed that Maluku is and should always be Islamic. He asked people: "Where does the name Maluku come from? He responded: "It comes from an Arabic term "Maliku or Muluk" which means "the land of lords" and is applied originally to a chain of five islands, to spice islands". It was only when Portuguese and Dutch colonized Maluku respectively that Maluku peoples became Christianized. Hence, Christianization and Colonialism for Al-Chaidar were identical. AlChaidar called Maluku conflict as "the Butchering of Muslims as an expression of fear on the side of Ambonese Christians." Al-Chaidar relied on Robert Chauvel's thesis on the threat of RMS against Indonesian nation-state and Muslim-Christian race since colonial times. Al-Chaidar for example cited Chauvel's statement that "the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Moluccas, RMS) and its suppression was (sic) a tragedy for Ambonese society. It was the worst possible way in which Ambon could have part of independent of Indonesia." 30 It follows from this that, Al-Chaidar believes, the Christian RMS played a role in the recent conflict in Maluku.
As has been often suggested, mass media played an important role in seeking and spreading reports and opinions. A number of hard-line These stories and the like reported by Islamic journals and verbal communicants have led 'radical Muslims' to hold demonstrations and to wage war against those whom they viewed as enemy. Religious sentiment was so deep that going to Ambon was regarded as the only alternative they had.
In this deeply psychological situation, it should not be surprising that street demonstrations took place in Java, Sumatera, Sulawesi, and other major cities as Muslims felt being increasingly victimized in Ambon, while the government was regarded impotent. Demonstrations were held by many hard-line organizations, including Association for Action of Indonesian Muslim Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), Association for Intra-campus Muslim Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus, HAMMAS), Indonesian Committee for World Islamic Solidarity (KISDI). Now they began to conceive of the conflict as religious war. They demanded that National MUI should issue a fatwa> to allow Muslims to go to Ambon as holy warriors (muja> hidi> n). An Islamic journal called Tabloid Aliansi Keadilan saw enough reasons driving the issuance of fatwa> instructing jiha> d in Maluku. First, the violence in Maluku was not an ordinary criminality; it was a planned religious violence against Muslims. Some churches such as Church at Hilo played a role in mobilizing Christians before attacking Muslims. Second, there was no real effective solution given by local and national government; the Indonesian army and police were not quick to prevent and reduce the increasing violence. In these uncertainties and dissatisfaction with Jakarta one independent Christian-based organization to have some insight about the Christian side. Jubilee Campaign, an interdenominational Christian human rights organization which worked for persecuted Christians all over the world, in their report in December 1999 criticized radical Islamic media, leaders, and organizations who depicted the conflict in Maluku as a field of jiha> d for Muslims against Christians. As for the background and the salient points of the conflict, Jubilee believed that the sectarian conflict was master-minded by Islamist Indonesian army (TNI) officers and Islamist organizations in Indonesia in an effort to change the constitution of Indonesia from a pluralist basis to the one that is flavored by Islamic Law and to Islamize the country as a whole.
Jubilee Campaign also refuted the allegations put forward by Islamic radicals that RMS masterminded the conflict. Jubilee asserted, the Christians have strongly reputed this allegation and RMS leaders in Holland (both Christians and Muslims in the movement) have also strongly denied their involvement in Maluku conflict. Jubilee Campaign requested to the Foreign Office and the European Union to pressure the Indonesian Government to prosecute all parties who incited and carried out unjustified violence, including those who are calling for jiha> d and ensure accurate reporting by the media and that that they do not incite religious hatred. 33 35 The two biggest religious organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) with some 35 millions membership and Muhammadiyyah with 30 millions followers, went in the same line. They did not perceive the conflict as the hard-liners did. Thus, for example, as KH Hasyim Muzadi, the president of NU, said, in Surabaya on April 8 th 2000, NU does not support solidarity actions in the form of Jihad in Ambon. Jihad with violence and agitation would aggravate, rather than solve, Maluku conflict. Any kinds of agitation are not helpful in solving the conflict. NU will only support the role of inter-religious leaders who would come to Ambon to calm Ambonese peoples by dialogue and persuasive approach. 36 NU leaders seem to believe that the series of conflict in Maluku were caused by complex factors that there was no need to bring it into a religious war. To believe that the conflict is a religious war would lead to a more hostile attitudes in both sides and the consequences would become worst and longer. Likewise, the As can be seen from the above figure, some 60 percent believed that the conflict in Maluku was not caused by religion. Some 68 percent believed that the conflict was not a religious war. A significant number of respondents still considered the conflict as religious. If religion becomes a factor, religious misinterpretation will be responsible for any conflict. The character of religion as a source of identity will also bring about conflict, while religious teachings serve a minor role in creating conflict. The polling suggests that people still believe in the innocence of religion, while they blame political interest as the main source of conflict (85 percent respondents). Some percentage (35 percent) considers socio-economic jealousy as a factor, while ethnic difference has a minor place in creating conflict. Since this polling was done on the same month of the first riot (January 1999). The polling indicates that religion was not the most important factor.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to examine some of the perceptions and attitudes as expressed by radical and moderate individuals, organizations, media as well as the public toward the conflict in Maluku. This has argued that there were no single views among Muslims concerning the conflict. The radicals in general have demonstrated hostile perceptions and confrontational attitudes toward the enemy. They perceived the conflict as a 'religious war', and demanded MUI to issue a fatwa> that would allow Muslims outside Maluku to fight against the enemy in Maluku. Some organizations, notably Laskar Jihad, decided to go to Maluku for jiha> d based on fatwa> s from Saudi `Ulama> '. In their reasoning, the radicals identified the conflict with the Medieval Crusades (perang salib), and accused Christian as separatists (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) as the master-mind of the first massive attack on January 19, 1999.
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The Muslim moderates, on the other hand, avoided religious vocabularies, while attempting to work out peaceful solutions. The semi-official MUI, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Muhammadiyyah perceived the conflict as not religiously driven; they viewed the conflict in a more sophisticated way; they saw no need to wage a religious war and no need to issue a fatwa> for a national jiha> d.
Although both radical and moderate strands of Islam made a link between the contemporary conflict and the colonial past, they saw it in a different way. The radicals tend to identity Christianity with European colonialism in such a way that justifies them to show hostility toward Christians, whereas the moderates were carefully reluctant to identify Christianity with European colonialism, considering the fact that colonial history and Christian history in Indonesia could have been different. Colonial history for the moderates should not be used as a justification for Christian-Muslim conflict.
In their polemics, the radicals tend to associate Christianity with colonialism and separatism. Muslim-Christian conflict in Maluku can be seen as part of the history of mutual distrust in Indonesia. 39 Radical Muslims perceived increasing Christianization in large part of Indonesia as also threatening the integrity of Islamic society (ummah). On the other hand, Christians are largely worried about what they perceived as Islamization and the establishment of Islamic State. Christians often viewed Islamic revival as similar to radicalism or fundamentalism. The idea of constitutionalization of the Islamic law has been regarded as threatening the pluralistic character of Indonesian nation-state.
Another point of difference has been the perception of the traditional institution of pela gandong. In their writings, some radicals underestimated the role of pela gandong in creating tolerance in Maluku especially for Muslims, and regarding this tradition as un-Islamic. While seeing that the conflict showed the fragility of pela gandong, the moderates still hoped that pela gandong can be revitalized and redefined.
Why did the radicals perceive the conflict the way they did? It can be argued that radicalism in Indonesia can be seen as an indication of a 
